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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. The State was Required to Prove Proximate Causation
The state argues that the district court properly summarily dismissed Jared's
petition for post-conviction relief because it was not required to prove proximate
causation and therefore counsel was not ineffective for failing to request proximate
causation instructions. Respondent's Brief pp. 7-9. This argument fails for two
reasons: 1) it is contrary to the statutory law and case law; and 2) it is contrary to
common sense and the rule oflenity. Moreover, the state's argument that even if
proof of causation is required, an instruction would have been superfluous is, as
evidenced by the Court of Appeals' opinion on direct appeal, contrary to the record.
The state also argues that appellate counsel could not have been ineffective
both because the state was not required to prove proximate cause and also because
even if it was required to prove proximate cause, the error would be better raised in
post-conviction. This argument fails both because the state was required to prove
proximate cause and also because the direct constitutional claim of a due process
violation is better raised in direct appeal. The error is better raised in direct appeal
because the standard of review is better and because it is no longer clear that direct
constitutional violations may be raised in post-conviction under any circumstances.
1. The State is Required to Prove Proximate Causation.
Therefore, this Court Should Reverse the Summary
Dismissal of the Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Trial
Counsel

Idaho Code § 18-4006(2) defines involuntary manslaughter as an unlawful
1

killing" ... in the operation of any firearm or deadly weapon in a reckless, careless
or negligent manner which produces death." The statute does not further define the
word "produces." And, the legislative history sheds no light on the meaning.
The state, instead of analyzing what the word "produces" means in relation to
firearms or deadly weapons, looks to the application of proximate cause in vehicular
manslaughter prosecutions.
Prior to 1965, vehicular manslaughter was prohibited under the motor
vehicle code. LC. § 49-1101 (1964) prohibited negligent homicide: "When the death
of any person ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury received by the
driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the person so
operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide." Id. When that section
was repealed, vehicular manslaughter was incorporated into the manslaughter
statute. LC. § 19-4006 (1965).
In 1972, the legislature re-codified the criminal code. The statement of
purpose for that re-codification states: "[I]t was the intent of the Senate to reestablish the criminal laws of the State of Idaho exactly as they were on December
31, 1972."
The manslaughter statute read in pertinent part:
18-4006 Manslaughter defined. - Manslaughter is the unlawful killing
of a human being, without malice. It is of two kinds:

2. Involuntary - . . . or in the operation of any firearm or deadly
2

weapon in a reckless, careless or negligent manner which produces
death; or in the operation of a motor vehicle:

Provided, this provision relating to the operation of a motor vehicle
shall not be construed as making any homicide in the driving of a
vehicle punishable as involuntary manslaughter which is not a
proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting
to a felony, or of the commission of a lawful act which might produce
death in an unlawful manner.
I.C. § 18-4006 (1972).
Although there does not appear to be any legislative history regarding the
incorporation of the negligent homicide statute from the motor vehicle code into the
criminal code , it seems that the legislature failed to require that death as a result of
the operation of a motor vehicle be "produced" by the operation of the vehicle, as it
was required for a firearm killing, and so it added the requirement from the motor
vehicle code that the death be a proximate result of the commission of the unlawful
act, not amounting to a felony, or lawful act. Nothing in this language indicates
that a person may be guilty of manslaughter as a result of the operation of a firearm
when the operation of the firearm did not produce the death.
In 1983, § 18-4006 was again amended. This time, the legislature created a
separate category of manslaughter: vehicular manslaughter. Involuntary
manslaughter still sanctioned "the operation of any firearm or deadly weapon in a
reckless , careless or negligent manner which produces death." I.C. § 18-4006(2)

(198:-3). But, now the statute also prohibited vehicular manslaughter in language
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applicable only to that crime. LC. § 18-4006(:3) (1983). That revision resulted in the
removal of the paragraph previously applicable to deaths resulting from the
operation of a motor vehicle requiring that the death be a proximate cause of the
vehicle's operation. Id.
In 1997, the vehicular manslaughter section of the statute was amended to
read in pertinent part: "Vehicular - in which the operation of a motor vehicle is the
primary cause contributing to the death ... " LC. § 18-4006(3) (1997). According to
the statement of purpose, RS 06562Cl, the change was intended to make it clear
that driving under the influence may still result in a finding of guilt for vehicular
manslaughter even though other causes, such as weather or lightening may have in
some way contributed to an accident which resulted in death. Id.
Today, the statute defines involuntary manslaughter as an unlawful killing:
[I]n the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any unlawful act,
other than those specified in section 18-4003(d), Idaho Code; or in the
commission of a lawful which might produce death in an unlawful
manner, or without due caution and circumspection; or in the operation
of any firearm or deadly weapon in a reckless, careless or negligent
manner which produces death.
LC. § 18-4006(2). And, the statute requires that the operation of the vehicle be a
"significant cause contributing to the death[.]" LC. § 18-4006(3).
The case law interpreting the current and previous iterations of the law
establishes the difference between "primary cause" and "produces" and further
whether both, one, or neither differs from "proximate cause."

State v. Monteith, 53 Idaho 30, 40, 20 P.2d 1023, 1027 (1933), cited by the
4

Court of Appeals in Jared's direct appeal, held that the question of proximate cause
was for the jury in a case charging involuntary manslaughter by driving an
automobile in a reckless, careless and heedless manner; driving while under the
influence; not on the right side of the road; and at an excessive speed. The
unlawful act relied upon had to be the proximate cause of the death.
In State v. Davidson, 78 Idaho 553, 309 P.2d 211 (1957), the Supreme Court
compared the involuntary manslaughter statute with the negligent homicide
statute. The involuntary manslaughter statute, J.C. § 18-4006 (1949), defined
homicide as the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, in the operation
of a motor vehicle in a reckless, careless, or negligent manner which produces death.
The negligent homicide statute, J.C. § 49-520.1 (1953), defined the homicide therein
as the death of any person as a proximate result of an injury received by the driving
of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others.
The Supreme Court found that the two statutes differed in phraseology, "but
little if any in meaning." 78 Idaho at 560, 309 P.2d at 216. In both, the driving
must have been a proximate cause of the death. Both include driving "into and
against [the victim] as the proximate result whereof her death ensued." 58 Idaho at
562, 309 P.2d at 217.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court declined to find error in the district court's
failure to instruct as to intervening proximate cause. This was not because such an
instruction would never be appropriate, but rather because there was no evidence of
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any conduct on the part of the victim which could have been an intervening
proximate cause of the accident resulting in her death. 58 Idaho at 569-570, 309
P.2d at 222-223.

State v. Cox, 82 Idaho 150, 351 P.2d 4 72 (1960), further explored the
causation requirement. Cox, after having several drinks, lost control of his car
when the steering rod disconnected. He veered into the wrong lane and hit a car
wherein Lola Kump was a passenger. Ms. Kump was taken to the hospital where
she died while her wounds were being sutured.
Cox's defense was that he could not be guilty of negligent homicide because
he lost control through the breaking of the steering mechanism and he was not
responsible for the death because the effect of the anaesthesia was a contributing
factor in Ms. Kump's death. However, the district court refused to instruct on
proximate cause. The Court found no error with regard to the medical treatment.
The Court held that the burden was upon the state to establish proximate cause by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And, further, unskillful medical treatment could
become an efficient intervening cause and thus become the proximate cause instead
of the defendant's actions. However, in this case, there was no evidence
establishing any negligence or deficient medical care. Thus, the instruction was not
supported by the evidence and need not have been given. 82 Idaho at 154-55, 351
P.2d at 474-75.
However, the Court did reverse Cox's conviction based upon another
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instructional error. Cox had requested an instruction stating," ... if you find that
the proximate cause of the collision was the breaking of the tie rod of the
defendant's automobile so that the automobile could not be steered, then you should
acquit the defendant even though you may believe that the defendant was under
the influence of an intoxicating beverage at the time of the accident." The Court
held that Cox was entitled to have his theory of the defense presented to the jury
and that the instruction was a proper statement of that theory. 82 Idaho at 158-59,
351 P.2d at 475.
In State v. McGlochlin) 85 Idaho 459, 381 P.2d 435 (1963), the Supreme
Court held that the defendant was entitled, in a negligent homicide prosecution, to
jury instructions to support his theory of the defense that the death was
proximately caused by the decedent suddenly stepping into the path of the
defendant's car as opposed to the defendant's negligence. 85 Idaho at 467, 381 P.2d
at 443.
The state maintains that in 1983 that the legislature repealed the proximate
cause requirement in the vehicular manslaughter statute. Respondent's Brief, p. 89. However, the case law is contrary to the state's assertion.
In 2010, the Supreme Court held that proof of causation is required. McKay

v. State) 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010). Per McKay) the jury must be
instructed that it must find that the defendant's intoxicated driving was a
"significant" cause of the death rather than simply the cause or a cause. Further, it
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must be instructed that the state must prove that the defendant's culpable conduct
contributed to the death. In that particular case, the jury could have had a
reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt because there was evidence that even
though McKay was intoxicated, the victim's taillightless motorcycle was stopped in
the roadway in the dark at the time of the collision.
Further, proximate cause has been held to be required for conviction of
involuntary manslaughter in a non-vehicle case. State v. Maxfield) 106 Idaho 206,
677 P.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1984). Maxfield, a naturopathic physician, treated Hill, a
man with chronic heart failure , with "colonic irrigation," a series of tap water
enemas, for his severe constipation. Hill developed cynaosis prior to leaving
Maxfield's office. Maxfield prescribed digitalis for an apparent heart condition, but
did not suggest that Hill go to the hospital. The next morning Hill did go to the
hospital where he died of acute heart failure. Maxfield was convicted of involuntary
manslaughter.
On appeal, Maxfield argued that there was insufficient proof of causation.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis:
We note initially that the state must prove each element of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. In homicide and related cases, this means
proving: (1) a death, and (2) the defendant unlawfully caused that
death. State v. Cutler) 94 Idaho 295, 4-86 P.2d 1008 (1971).
106 Idaho at 207, 677 P.2d at 520.
The Court noted testimony from the doctor who performed the autopsy that
"but for the acute heart failure Hill would not have died when he did." Id.
8

A second doctor testified that it is possible that chronic heart failure could
become acute heart failure as a result of a variety of factors including stress,
exercise, changes in altitude, or enemas. The Court of Appeals held that this
testimony, by itself, was not enough to support a guilty verdict because it
established no more than a probability that Maxfield's treatment caused Hill's
death. 106 Idaho at 208, 677 P.2d at 521.
However, on redirect, the second doctor testified that it was reasonable to
assume that there was a cause and effect relationship between the enemas and the
worsened condition, and further that the enemas aggravated the existing heart
condition to a fairly severe degree. The Court concluded:
We believe these additional passages indicate that Dr. Owens
established to a reasonable medical certainty, a causal relationship
between the enema treatment and the deterioration of Hill's condition.
The jury's justifiable inference that Hill's worsened condition led to his
death, derived from the facts that Hill had to be hospitalized the
morning after the treatment and that he died soon thereafter,
completes the causal chain.
106 Idaho at 209, 677 P.2d at 522.
Of note, the Court looked at the completion of the causal chain. The state
was required to prove a completion of the chain. Presumably, had there been an
interruption of the chain, the outcome would have been different. Clearly, had Hill
gone to the hospital and the doctors there been able to save his life, Maxfield would
not have been guilty of manslaughter. But, further, had the enemas, although
potentially dangerous, not actually affected the heart failure, but Hill left Maxfield's
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office and engaged in exercise at a high altitude which did induce acute heart
failure, Maxfield likewise would not have been guilty of manslaughter.
These cases are consistent with the corpus delicti requirement. "In homicide
cases, the corpus delicti consists of two elements: (1) the death of the individual
'named in the charge as ... being dead:" and (2) the death was caused by a criminal
act of the defendant." State v. Severson, 14 7 Idaho 694, 712-13, 215 P.3d 414, 43233 (2009), citing State v. Cutler, 94 Idaho at 296, 486 P.2d at 1009 (1971). 1
Applying Severson, the state was required to prove that Michael's death was
caused by a criminal act by Jared. And, that required proof of the completion of a
causal chain, i.e., proximate cause without an intervening cause. State v. Maxwell,

supra.
This same reasoning has been a pp lied in at least three other areas of the
criminal law, including arson, the determination of who is a victim for purposes of
the Victim's Rights Act, and restitution.

1

State v. Suriner, 154 Idaho 81, 294 P.3d 1093 (2013), abandoned the corpus
delicti rule that "the fact that a crime has been committed cannot be proved by the
extrajudicial confessions or statements of the prisoner and that there must be some
evidence or corroborating circumstances tending to show that a crime has been
committed, aside from such confessions or statements." 154 Idaho at 83, 294 P.3d
at 1096, quoting State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 705, 70 P. 1051, 1052 (1902).
However, in abandoning the rule requiring evidence or corroborating circumstances
tending to show that a crime has been committed aside from the confessions of the
defendant, the Court did not abandon the rule that the state must prove in some
fashion that a crime has been committed. Rather, the Court held that the jury can
give the defendant's extrajudicial confession or statement whatever weight it deems
appropriate along with all of the other evidence when deciding whether the state
has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., 154 Idaho at 88, 294 P.3d at 1100.
10

State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 427-29, 348 P.3d 1, 42-44 (2015), holds that
an intervening cause may break the causal chain and prevent a conviction for arson.
The arson statute provides that "Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or
explosion, damages ... [a]ny dwelling, whether occupied or not ... is guilty of arson
in the first degree .... " LC. § 18-802. The Court wrote, based upon this statutory
language, which does not include an express proximate cause requirement:
'An intervening, superseding cause generally refers to an independent
act or force that breaks the causal chain between the defendant's
culpable act and the victim's injury. The intervening cause becomes
the proximate cause of the victim's injury and removes the defendant's
act as the proximate cause.' State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 37 4-75,
223 P.2d 75-, 757-58 (2009) (citations omitted). The defendant is
relieved of criminal liability only if the intervening cause is 'an
unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence.' Id. at 375, 223 p.3d at
758. 'The defendant remains criminally liable if either the possible
consequences might reasonably have been contemplated or the
defendant should have foreseen the possibility of harm of the kind that
could result from his act.' Id. Based on our interpretation of Idaho's
arson statute, we recognize that in subsequent arson prosecutions an
instruction on causation may be necessary depending on the facts of
the case.

State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 428, 348 P.3d at 43. 2
In State v. Lampien, supra, the Supreme Court construed the Compensation
of Victims of Crimes Act, which provides rights such as restitution and reiterates
the rights of victims provided for in Art. I, § 22 of the state constitution. LC. §§ 19-

2

In its brief, the state argues that the instructions in Jared's case could not
be erroneous because they were patterned on the statutory language, citing State v.
Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 362, 690 P.2d 293, 297 (1984). Respondent's Brief p. 7.
This argument is contrary to Abdullah which notes that causation instructions may
be required even when the statutory language uses only the term "damages ."
11

5301- 19-5307. The statute defines a victim as "an individual who suffers direct or
threatened physical, financial or emotional harm as the result of the commission of
a crime or juvenile offense." I.C. § 19-5306(5)(a). The Court determined that the
words "as a result" require that the victim's injuries were caused by the commission
of the crime. State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374, 223 P.3d at 757. And, then the
Court applied the principles of causation articulated in the tort law, where
causation consists of actual cause and true proximate cause. The Court noted that
this analysis includes an analysis of intervening cause which can become the
proximate cause and remove the defendant's act as the proximate cause. Id.
Applying this analysis, the Court held that the district court did not err in allowing
police and probation officers to testify at Lampien's sentencing for harboring and
protecting a felon.
The same analysis of proximate and intervening causation is applied in
determining whether restitution may be awarded. See, State v. Cotterell, 152 Idaho
387, 271 P.3d 1243 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Houser, 155 Idaho 521, 314 P.3d 203
(Ct. App. 2013); State v. McNeil, 158 Idaho 280, 313 P.3d 48 (Ct. App. 2013); State v.

Davis, 156 Idaho 671, 330 P.3d 417 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. Wisdom, _

Idaho _

,

393 P.3d 576 (2017).
The state's assertion that it was not required to prove causation is contrary to
the law. The argument is also contrary to common sense and the rule of leniety.
Proof of proximate ca use is required in law because "if every causally relevant

12

condition (cause-in-fact) is treated as grounding responsibility for the outcomes to
which it is causally relevant the extent of legal responsibility will extend almost
indefinitely." Honore, Anthony, "Causation in the Law", The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-law/>
Further, if this Court should find that the statute is ambiguous as to whether
proximate cause is required, the rule of lenity applies and the statute must be
construed in favor of the accused. State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 440, 313 P.3d
765, 768 (Ct. App. 2013), citing State v. Dewey, 131 Idaho 846, 848, 965 P.2d 206,
208 (Ct. App. 1998). Applying the rule of lenity, proof of causation is required.
The state also argues that even if the jury was required to find proximate
cause, instructions on proximate cause "would have been superfluous." The state
bases this argument on the district court's statement that Michael's conduct was not
unforeseeable nor extraordinary as is required to break the causal chain.
Respondent's Brief p. 9. However, both the state's argument and the district court's
statement are contrary to the record. The only testimony as to what happened in
the truck was Khali's. She testified that given the manner in which Jared held the
gun, a bullet could not have hit anyone if Michael had not slid over and placed the
barrel in his mouth. Trial Tr. P. 333, In. 18-p. 334, In. 15. The state presented no
evidence whatsoever to contradict this. Nor did the state present any evidence that
Jared had any reason to suspect that Michael was suicidal and would put the barrel
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of a gun in his mouth. Contrary to the state's conclusion, an instruction on
causation, including instruction on proximate and intervening causes would not
have been superfluous . Rather, such instruction was necessary.
This is further evidenced by the Court of Appeals' opinion in the direct
appeal. The Court of Appeals found that the evidence was sufficient to support the
verdict, without an analysis of proximate cause. However, the Court noted:
"Whether the evidence would have also been sufficient to sustain a verdict by a jury
instructed on proximate cause and intervening cause is a different question and one
that we decline to address[.]" Augmented R 563-64.
The instructions would not have been superfluous. As noted by the Court of
Appeals, they would have presented the jury with a different factual question.
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the order summarily dismissing
his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and remand with instructions to
either grant relief or hold an evidentiary hearing.
2. Because the State was Required to Prove Proximate
Causation , this Court Should Reverse the Summary
Dismissal of the Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Appellate Counsel
Jared fully briefed the error in summarily dismissing the claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel in his Opening Brief. Nothing the state has argued
in its brief changes the analysis of the Opening Brief or merits reply.
As set out in the Opening Brief, the issue of fundamental error in failing to
properly instruct the jury as to causation was clearly stronger than the issue of the
14

sufficiency of the evidence under the improper instructions . The fundamental error
in the instructions would have been subject to free review on direct appeal. State v.

Hadden, 152 Idaho 371, 374, 271 P.3d 1227, 1230 (Ct. App. 2013). And, as set out
in the Opening Brief, if appellate counsel had raised the instructional error, there is
a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Therefore, this Court should reverse the summary
dismissal of the claim of ineffective assistance on appeal and remand either with
instructions to grant relief or to hold an evidentiary hearing.

III. CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the order of summary dismissal. Jared did raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to both ineffective assistance of trial counsel and as
to appellate counsel. At the very least, he should be allowed an evidentiary hearing
to produce further evidence to support his claims. But, given the state of the record,
this Court should grant greater relief - reverse and remand with instructions to
grant post-conviction relief.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of June, 2017.
ls/Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Michael Thompson

15

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND SERVICE
The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief submitted is in
compliance with all of the requirements set out in I.A.R 34.1, and that an electronic
copy was served on each party at the following email address(es): Idaho State
Attorney General, Criminal Law Division
ecf@ag.idaho.gov
Dated and certified this 14t1i day of June, 2017.

ls/Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin

16

